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Abstract— Data aggregation in intermediate nodes (called 
aggregator nodes) is an effective approach for optimizing 
consumption of scarce resources like bandwidth and energy in 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, in-network 
processing poses a problem for the privacy of the sensor data 
since individual data of sensor nodes need to be known to the 
aggregator node before the aggregation process can be carried 
out.  In applications of WSNs, privacy-preserving data 
aggregation has become an important requirement due to 
sensitive nature of the sensor data.  Researchers have proposed a 
number of protocols and schemes for this purpose.  He et al. 
(INFOCOM 2007) have proposed a protocol - called CPDA - for 
carrying out additive data aggregation in a privacy-preserving 
manner for application in WSNs. The scheme has been quite 
popular and well-known.  In spite of the popularity of this 
protocol, it has been found that the protocol is vulnerable to 
attack and it is also not energy-efficient.  In this paper, we first 
present a brief state of the art survey on the current privacy-
preserving data aggregation protocols for WSNS. Then we 
describe the CPDA protocol and identify its security 
vulnerability. Finally, we demonstrate how the protocol can be 
made secure and energy efficient.  
Keywords-wireless sensor network; privacy; data aggregation; 
cluster-based private data aggregation (CPDA); key distribution; 
collusion attack; malicious node. 
I.  INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
In recent years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have 
drawn considerable attention from the research community on 
issues ranging from theoretical research to practical 
applications. Special characteristics of WSNs, such as resource 
constraints on energy and computational power and security 
have been well-defined and widely studied [1, 2]. What has 
received less attention, however, is the critical privacy concern 
on information being collected, transmitted, and analyzed in a 
WSN. Such private and sensitive information may include 
payload data collected by sensors and transmitted through the 
network to a centralized data processing server. For example, a 
patient’s blood pressure, sugar level and other vital signs are 
usually of critical privacy concern when monitored by a 
medical WSN which transmits the data to a remote hospital or 
doctor’s office. Privacy concerns may also arise beyond data 
content and may focus on context information such as the 
location of a sensor initiating data communication. Effective 
countermeasure against the disclosure of both data and context-
oriented private information is an indispensable prerequisite for 
deployment of WSNs in real-world applications.  
Privacy protection has been extensively studied in various 
fields related to WSNs such as wired and wireless networking, 
databases and data mining. Nonetheless, the following inherent 
features of WSNs introduce unique challenges for privacy 
preservation in WSNs, and prevent the existing techniques 
from being directly transplanted: (i) Uncontrollable 
environment: Sensors may have to be deployed to an 
environment uncontrollable by the defender, such as a 
battlefield, enabling an adversary to launch physical attacks to 
capture sensor nodes or deploy counterfeit ones. As a result, an 
adversary may retrieve private keys used for secure 
communication and decrypt any communication eavesdropped 
by the adversary. (ii) Sensor-node resource constraints: 
battery-powered sensor nodes generally have severe constraints 
on their ability to store, process, and transmit the sensed data. 
As a result, the computational complexity and resource 
consumption of public-key ciphers is usually considered 
unsuitable for WSNs. (iii) Topological constraints: the limited 
communication range of sensor nodes in a WSN requires 
multiple hops in order to transmit data from the source to the 
base station. Such a multi-hop scheme demands different nodes 
to take diverse traffic loads. In particular, a node closer to the 
base station (i.e., data collecting and processing server) has to 
relay data from nodes further away from base station in 
addition to transmitting its own generated data, leading to 
higher transmission rate. Such an unbalanced network traffic 
pattern brings significant challenges to the protection of 
context-oriented privacy information. Particularly, if an 
adversary holds the ability of global traffic analysis, observing 
the traffic patterns of different nodes over the whole network, it 
can easily identify the sink and compromise context privacy, or 
even manipulate the sink node to impede the proper 
functioning of the WSN. 
The unique challenges for privacy preservation in WSNs 
call for the development of effective privacy-preserving 
techniques. Supporting efficient in-network data aggregation 
while preserving data privacy has emerged as an important 
requirement in numerous wireless sensor network applications 
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. As a key approach to fulfilling this requirement 
of private data aggregation, concealed data aggregation (CDA) 
schemes have been proposed in which multiple source nodes 
send encrypted data to a sink along a converge-cast tree with 
aggregation of cipher-text being performed over the route [4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9].   
He et al. have proposed a cluster-based private data 
aggregation (CPDA) scheme in which the sensor nodes are 
randomly distributed into clusters [3]. The cluster leaders are 
responsible for directly aggregating data from the cluster 
members, with the communication secured by a shared key 
between a pair of communicating nodes. The aggregate 
function leverages algebraic properties of the polynomials to 
compute the desired aggregate value in a cluster. While the 
aggregation is carried out at the aggregator node in each 
cluster, it is guaranteed that no individual node gets to know 
the sensitive private values of other nodes in the cluster. The 
intermediate aggregate value in each cluster is further 
aggregated along the routing tree as the data packets move to 
the sink node. The privacy goal of the scheme is two-fold.  
First, the privacy of data has to be guaranteed end-to-end. 
While only the sink could learn about the final aggregation 
result, each node will have information of its own data and 
does not have any information about the data of other nodes. 
Second, to reduce the communication overhead, the data from 
different source nodes have to be efficiently combined by 
intermediate nodes (i.e. aggregation) along the path. 
Nevertheless, these intermediate nodes should not learn any 
information about the individual nodes’ data. The authors of 
the CPDA scheme have presented performance results of the 
protocol to demonstrate the efficiency and security of the 
protocol. The CPDA protocol has become quite popular, and to 
the best of our knowledge, there has been no identified 
vulnerability of the protocol published in the literature. 
In this paper, we first provide an alternative approach to 
CPDA protocol so that sensor data aggregation can be carried 
out in a more efficient manner and then proceed to describe a 
potential attack on CPDA to show the vulnerability of the 
scheme. We also propose necessary modifications in the 
scheme to defend against the identified vulnerability.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
briefly describes some of the existing secure and privacy-
preserving aggregation schemes for WSNs. Section III 
provides a brief discussion on the CPDA scheme. Section IV 
presents an attack on the CPDA scheme.  Section V discusses 
how the CPDA scheme can be modified to make it more secure 
and computationally more efficient. Finally, Section VI 
concludes the paper while highlighting some future scope of 
work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Researchers have considered security as an important 
requirement in designing any aggregation scheme for WSNs. In 
addition, privacy also has been identified as one of the 
emerging requirements in many WSNs applications, and hence 
attracted a lot of attention. 
Hu and Evans have proposed a secure aggregation (SA) 
protocol that uses µTESLA protocol [10]. The protocol is 
resilient to both intruder devices and single device key 
compromises. The scheme uses a tree structure to represent the 
nodes, where the leaves represent the sensor nodes and the 
nodes in the higher levels act at the aggregators. However, the 
protocol is vulnerable if any intermediate node and any one (or 
more) of its children are compromised due to its failure to 
verify authenticity of the nodes because of delayed disclosure 
of the symmetric keys. 
Cam et al. proposed an energy-efficient secure patter-based 
data aggregation (ESPDA) protocol for WSNs [11]. ESPDA is 
applicable for hierarchical WSNs. In ESPDA, a designated 
cluster-head node sends requests to sensor nodes for sending 
pattern codes of the data being sensed. If multiple sensor nodes 
send the same pattern code to the cluster-head, only one of the 
sensor nodes is allowed to send its data. ESPDA is a secure 
protocol since the aggregator nodes are not required to decrypt 
the data for aggregation. However, it has a high computational 
overhead.  
To defend against attacks by malicious aggregator nodes in 
WSNs which may falsely manipulate data during the 
aggregation process, a mechanism using cryptographic 
technique has been proposed by Wu et al. [12]. An aggregation 
tree is constructed that monitors the activities of the aggregator 
nodes. The child nodes of an aggregator monitor the incoming 
data to the aggregator using the neighborhood watch 
mechanism [13], and invoke a voting protocol if any suspicious 
activity by the aggregator node is observed. 
Ozdemir has proposed a secure and reliable data 
aggregation scheme that makes use of web of trust among the 
nodes in a WSN [14].  The concepts of trust and reputation 
have been extensively used for designing security protocols for 
multi-hop wireless networks like mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs), wireless mesh networks (WMNs) and WSNs [15, 
16, 17]. In the scheme proposed by Ozdemir, sensor nodes 
exchange trust values in their neighborhood to form a web of 
trust that facilitates in determining secure and reliable paths to 
the aggregator nodes. The sensor nodes which belong to the 
web of trust are more reliable and their observations are given 
higher weights in the data aggregation process. 
An aggregation protocol based on a distributed estimation 
algorithm for WSNs has been proposed in [18]. The protocol is 
secure and resistant to insider attack by any malicious or 
compromised node in the network.  
Over the past few years, several schemes have been 
proposed in the literature for privacy-preserving data 
aggregation in WSNs. One of the most elegant approaches in 
this regard is homomorphic encryption [19]. Westhoff et al. 
have proposed additive homomorphic encryption scheme (it 
allows addition operation to be carried out on encrypted input 
data without requiring decryption of the cipher-text inputs) to 
ensure end-to-end data privacy of the sensor nodes and the base 
station [7]. Armknecht et al. have presented a symmetric 
encryption scheme for WSN data aggregation [8]. The scheme 
is a bi-homomorphic encryption scheme since it is 
homomorphic both for data and the keys for additive functions. 
Castellucia et al. proposed a scheme that utilizes an 
inexpensive encryption technique in aggregation methods to 
ensure data privacy in WSNs. A very simple, yet elegant 
approach for privacy-preserving multi-party computation is 
proposed by Chaum [20]. Castellucia et al. have described how 
inexpensive encryption operations may be exploited in 
aggregation schemes for WSNs to ensure data privacy [5]. 
III. THE CPDA SCHEME FOR DATA AGGREGATION 
A. The Network Model 
The basic idea of CPDA is to introduce noise to the raw 
data sensed from a WSN, such that an aggregator can obtain 
accurate aggregated information but not individual data points 
[3]. This is similar to the data perturbation approach 
extensively used in privacy-preserving data mining. However, 
unlike in privacy-preserving data mining where noises are 
independently generated (at random) and therefore leads to 
imprecise aggregated results, the noises in CPDA are carefully 
designed to leverage the cooperation between different sensor 
nodes, such that the precise aggregated values can be obtained 
by the aggregator. In particular, CPDA classifies sensor nodes 
into two categories: cluster leaders and cluster members. There 
is a one-to-many mapping between the cluster leaders and 
cluster members. The cluster leaders are responsible for 
directly aggregating data from cluster members, with the 
communication secured by a different shared key between any 
pair of communicating nodes.  
The WSN is modeled as a connected graph G(V, E), where 
V represents the set of senor nodes and E represents the set of 
wireless links connecting the sensor nodes. The number of 
sensor nodes is taken as |V| = N. 
A data aggregation function is taken that aggregates the 
individual sensor readings. CPDA scheme has focused on 
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individual sensor reading at time instant to for node i. For 
computation of the aggregate functions, the following 
requirements are to be satisfied: (i) privacy of the individual 
sensor data is to be protected, i.e., each node’s should be 
known none other expect the node itself, (ii) the number of 
messages transmitted within the WSN for the purpose of data 
aggregation should be kept at a minimum, and (iii) the 
aggregation result should be as accurate as possible. 
B. Key Distribution and Management 
CPDA uses a random key distribution mechanism proposed 
in [21] for encrypting messages to prevent message 
eavesdropping attacks. The key distribution scheme has three 
phases: (i) key pre-distribution, (ii) shared-key discovery, and 
(iii) path-key establishment. These phases are described briefly 
as follows. 
 A large key-pool of K keys and their identities are first 
generated in the key pre-distribution phase. For each sensor 
nodes, k keys out of the total K keys are chosen. These k keys 
form a key ring for the sensor node.  
During the key-discovery phase, each sensor node identifies 
which of its neighbors share a common key with itself by 
invoking and exchanging discovery messages. If a pair of 
neighbor nodes share a common key, then it is possible to 
establish a secure link between them.  
In the path-key establishment phase, an end-to-end path-
key is assigned to the pairs of neighboring nodes who do not 
share a common key but can be connected by two or more 
multi-hop secure links at the end of the shared-key discovery 
phase. At the end of the key distribution phase, the probability 
that any pair of nodes possess at least one common key is given 
by (1): 
                           
!)!2(
))!((1
2
KkK
kKpconnect
−
−
−=                    (1) 
 
If the probability that any other node can overhear the 
encrypted message by a given key is denoted as poverhear, then 
poverhear is given by (2): 
 
                                 
K
kpoverhear =                                     (2) 
 
It has been shown in [3] that the above key distribution 
algorithm is efficient for communication in a large-scale sensor 
networks, when there is a limited number of keys available for 
encryption of the messages to prevent eavesdropping attacks. 
C. Cluster-Based Private Data Aggregation (CPDA)  
The CPDA scheme works in three phases: (i) cluster 
formation, (ii) computation of aggregate results in clusters, and 
(ii) cluster data aggregation. These phases are described below. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 1.  (a) Query server Q sends HELLO message to its neighbors. (b) An 
and D randomly elect themselves as the cluster leaders and send HELLO 
messages to their neighbors. E and F join the cluster formed by Q. B and C 
join the cluster formed with A as the cluster leader. 
Cluster formation: Fig. 1 depicts the cluster formation 
process. A query server Q triggers a query by a HELLO 
message. When the HELLO message reaches a sensor node, it 
elects itself as a cluster leader with a pre-defined probability pc. 
If a node becomes a cluster leader, it forwards the HELLO 
message to its neighbors; otherwise, it waits for a threshold 
period of time to check whether any HELLO message arrives at 
it from any of its neighbors. If any HELLO message arrives at 
the node, it decides to join the cluster formed by its neighbor be 
broadcasting a JOIN message. This process is repeated and 
multiple clusters are formed so that the entire WSN becomes a 
collection of a set of clusters. 
Computation within clusters: In this phase, aggregation is 
done in each cluster. The computation is illustrated with the 
example of a simple case where a cluster contains three 
members: A, B, and C, where A is the assumed as the cluster 
leader and the aggregator, B and C are the cluster members. Let 
a, b, c represent the private data held by the nodes A, B, and C 
respectively. The goal of the aggregation scheme is to compute 
the sum of a, b and c without revealing the private values of the 
nodes. 
As shown in Fig. 2, for the privacy-preserving additive 
aggregation function, the nodes A, B, and C  are assumed to 
share three public non-zero distinct numbers, which are 
denoted as x, y, and z respectively. In addition, node A 
generates two random numbers r1A and r2A, which are known 
only to node A. Similarly, nodes B and C generate r1B, r2B and 
r1
C
, r2
C
 respectively. 
 
Figure 2.  Nodes A, B and C broadcast their public seeds x, y and z 
respectively 
Node A computes vAA, vBA, and vCA as represented in (3): 
2
21 xrxrav
AAA
A ++=  
                               
2
21 yryrav
AAA
B ++=                           (3)                                 
2
21 zrzrav
AAA
C ++=  
 
Similarly, node B computes vAB, vBB, vCB  using (4):   
2
21 xrxrbv BBBA ++=  
                               
2
21 yryrbv BBBB ++=                           (4)             
2
21 zrzrbv
BBB
C ++=  
 
Likewise, node C computes vAC, vBC, and vCC  using (5): 
                              
2
21 xrxrcv
CCC
A ++=  
                             
2
21 yryrcv
CCC
B ++=                           (5) 
                              
2
21 zrzrcv
CCC
C ++=  
 
Node A encrypts vBA and sends to B using the shared key 
between A and B. It also encrypts vCA and sends to C using the 
sharing key between A and C. In the same manner, node B 
sends encrypted vAB to A and vCB to node C; node C sends 
encrypted vAC and vBC to nodes A and B respectively. The 
exchange of these encrypted messages is depicted in Fig. 3. On 
receiving vAB and vAC, node A computes the sum of vAA (already 
computed by A), vAB and vAC. Now, node A computes FA using 
(6) as follows: 
     
2
21)( xrxrcbavvvF CABAAAA ++++=++=           (6) 
 
 
Figure 3.  Exchange of encrypted messages among nodes A, B and C using 
their shared keys 
                                
In (6), CBA rrrr 1111 ++=  and CBA rrrr 2222 ++= . 
Similarly, nodes B and C compute FB and FC respectively, 
where FB and FC are given by (7) and (8) respectively: 
      
2
21)( yryrcbavvvF CBBBABB ++++=++=          (7)                   
                     
2
21)( zrzrcbavvvF CCBCACC ++++=++=          (8)                  
 
The nodes B and C broadcast FB and FC to the cluster leader 
node A, so that the node A has the knowledge of the values of 
FA, FB and FC. From these values the cluster leader A can 
compute the aggregated value (a + b + c) as explained below.  
The equations (6), (7), and (8) can be rewritten as in (9): 
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Since x, y, z, FA, FB, and FC are known to the cluster leader 
A, it can compute the value of (a + b + c), without having any 
knowledge of b and c.  
In order to avoid eavesdropping attack by neighbors, it is 
necessary to encrypt the values of vBA, vCA, vAB, vCB, vAC, and 
vB
C
. If node B overhears the value of vCA, then node B gets 
access to the values of vCA, vBA and FA. Then node B can 
deduce AC
A
BA
A
A vvFv −−= . Having the knowledge of vAA, the 
node B can further obtain the value of a if x, vAA, vAB and vAC 
are known. However, if node A encrypts vCA and sends it to 
node C, then node B cannot get vCA. With the knowledge of vBA, 
FA and x from node A, node B cannot deduce the value of a. 
However, if nodes B and C collude and reveal A’s information 
(vBA and vCA), to each other, then A’s privacy will be 
compromised and its private value a will be revealed. In order 
to reduce the probability of such attacks, the cluster size should 
be as large as possible, since in a large cluster (of size m), at 
least (m- 1) nodes should collude in order to successfully 
launch the attack. 
D. Cluster Data Aggregation  
The CPDA scheme has been implemented on top of a 
protocol known as Tiny Aggregation (TAG) protocol [22]. 
Using the TAG protocol, each cluster leader node routes the 
sum of values in its cluster to the query server through a TAG 
routing tree whose root is situated at the server. 
IV. AN ATTACK ON THE CPDA PROTOCOL 
In this section, we present an efficient attack on the CPDA 
aggregation scheme. The objective of the attack is to show the 
vulnerability of the CPDA scheme which can be suitably 
exploited by a malicious participating sensor node. The 
intention of the malicious node is to participate in the scheme 
in such a way that it can get access to the private values (i.e., a, 
b and c) of the participating sensor nodes. For describing the 
attack scenario, we use the same example cluster consisting of 
three sensor nodes A, B and C. The node A is the cluster leader 
whereas B and C are the cluster members. We distinguish two 
types of attacks: (i) attack by a malicious cluster leader (e.g., 
node A) and (ii) attack by a malicious cluster member (e.g., 
either node B or node C). These two cases are described in 
detail in the following sub-sections. 
A. Attack by a Malicious Cluster Leader Node 
Let us assume that the cluster leader A is malicious. Node A 
chooses a very large value of x so that x >> y, z. Since the 
values of y and z are public values of B and C which are 
broadcast by their sources (i.e., B and C), it is easy for A to 
choose a suitable value for x.  
Nodes A, B and C compute the values of vAA, vBA, vCA, vAB, 
vB
B
, vC
B
, vA
C
, vB
C
, and vCC using (3), (4) and (5) as described in 
Section III C. As per the CPDA scheme, node A receives 
2
21 xrxrbv BBBA ++= from node B. Since x is very large 
compared to b and r1B, node A can derive the value of r2B using 
(10) as follows: 
              
BBBB
A rrxrxbxv 22122 /// =++=                    (10) 
 
Using the value of r2B as derived in (10), node A can now 
compute the value of r1B  using (11) as follows: 
              
BBBB
A rrxbxxrv 1122 //)( =+=−                     (11) 
 
In the same manner, node A derives the values of r1C and 
r2
C
 from vAC that it receives from node C. Since 
CBA rrrr 1111 ++= , and 
CBA rrrr 2222 ++= , in (6), (7) and 
(8), node A can compute the values of r1 and r2 (r1B, r2B, r1C, 
and r2C are derived and r1A and r2A are generated by node A).  
At this stage, node A uses FB and FC values as sent by 
nodes B and C in (7) and (8) respectively. Node A has now two 
linear simultaneous equations with two unknowns: b and c, the 
values of y and z being public. Solving (7) and (8) for b and c, 
the malicious cluster leader node A can get the access to the 
private information of nodes B and C, thereby launching a 
privacy attack on the CPDA scheme. 
B. Attack by a Malicious Cluster Member Node 
In this scenario, let us assume that the cluster member B is 
malicious and it tries to access the private values of the cluster 
leader A and the cluster member C. Node B chooses a very 
large value of y so that y >> x, z. Once the value of FB is 
computed in (7), node B derives the value of r2 and r1 using 
(12) and (13) as follows: 
     221
22 //)(/ rryrycbayFB =++++=           (12) 
      11
2
2 /)(/)( rrycbayyrFB =+++=−           (13) 
 
As per the CPDA scheme, node B receives 
2
21 yryrcv
CCC
B ++= from node C. Since y is very large 
compared to c and r1C, and r2C node B can derive the value of 
r2
C
 and r1C using (14) and (15) as follows: 
              
CCCC
B rryrycyv 221
22 /// =++=                   (14) 
 
              
CCCC
B rrycyyrv 11
2
2 //)( =+=−                    (15) 
 
 
Using (12), (13), (14) and (15), node B can 
compute CBA rrrr 1111 −−= , and 
CBA rrrr 2222 −−= . Now, 
node B can compute the value of a using 
2
21 yryrav
AAA
B ++= (received from A), in which values of 
all the variables are known except a. In a similar fashion, node 
B derives the value of c using 221 yryrcv
CCC
B ++=  
(received from C). 
Since the private values of the nodes A and C are known to 
node B, the privacy attack launched by participating cluster 
member node B is successful on the CPDA aggregation 
scheme. 
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATION IN CPDA PROTOCOL 
In this section, we present two modifications of CPDA 
scheme: one towards making the protocol more efficient and 
the other for making it more secure and robust. 
A. Modified CPDA for Enhanced Energy Efficiency 
In this section, a modification is proposed for the CPDA 
protocol for achieving enhanced efficiency of its operation. The 
modification is based on suitable choice for the value of x (the 
public seed) done by the aggregator node A.  
Let us assume that the node A chooses a large value of x 
such that the following conditions are satisfied.  
                                xrxr 1
2
2 >>                                       (16) 
                           )(1 cbaxr ++>>                                 (17) 
In (16) and (17), CBA rrrr 1111 ++=  and 
CBA rrrr 2222 ++= . Now, node A has computed the value of 
FA as in (6). In order to efficiently compute the value of (a + b 
+ c), node A divides the value of FA by x2 as shown in (18) 
     22
2
1
22 //)(/ rrxxrxcbaxFA =++++=            (18) 
 
Using (18), node A derives the value of r2. Once the value 
of r2 is deduced, node A attempts to compute the value of r1 as 
follows. 
                  xrcbaxrFA 122 )( +++=−                        (19) 
            xxrFxcbaxxrFr AA /)(/)(/)( 22221 −=++−−=    (20)                 
 
Since, the values of FA, r2 and x are all known to node A, it 
can compute the value of r1 using (13). Once the values of r1 
and r2 are computed by node A, it can compute the value of (a 
+ b + c) using (6). Since the computation of the sum (a + b + c) 
by node A involves two division operations only (as done in 
(12) and (13)), the modified CPDA scheme will be extremely 
light-weight and hence much more energy- and time- efficient 
as compared with the original CPDA scheme. The original 
CPDA scheme involved extra computation of the values of FB 
and FC an expensive matrix inversion operation as described in 
Section III C.  
B. Modified CPDA for Increased Security and Robustness 
In this section, we discuss the modifications required on the 
existing CPDA scheme so that a malicious participant node 
cannot launch the attack described in Section IV. 
It may be noted that, the essential vulnerability of the 
CPDA scheme lies in the unrestricted freedom delegated on the 
participating nodes for generating their public seed values. For 
example, nodes A, B and C have no restrictions on values of x, 
y and z respectively while these values are generated by the 
nodes. A malicious attacker exploits this freedom to generate 
an arbitrarily large public seed value and launches the attack as 
discussed in Section IV.  
In order to prevent such an attack, the CPDA protocol 
needs to be modified. In this modified version, the nodes in a 
cluster make a check on the generated public seed values so 
that it is not possible for a malicious participant to generate any 
arbitrarily large seed value. For a cluster with three nodes, such 
a constraint may be imposed by the requirement that the sum of 
any two public seeds must be greater than the third seed.  In 
other words: x + y > z, z + x > y, and y + z > x. If these 
constraints are satisfied by the generated values of x, y and z, it 
will be impossible for any node to launch the attack and get 
access to the private values of the other participating nodes. 
However, even if the above restrictions on the values of x, y 
and z are imposed, the nodes should be careful in choosing the 
values for their secret random number pairs. If two nodes 
happen to choose very large values for their random numbers 
compared to those chosen by the third node, then it will be 
possible for the third node to get access to the private values of 
the other two nodes. For example, let us assume that nodes A 
and C have chosen the values of r1A, r2A and r1C, r2C such that 
they are all much larger than r1B and r2B - the private random 
number pair chosen by node B. It will be possible for node B to 
derive the values of a and c: the private values of nodes A and 
C respectively. This is explained in the following. 
Node B receives 221 yryrav
AAA
B ++=  from node A and 
computes the values of r1A and r2A using (21) and (22) as 
follows: 
            
AAAA
A rryryayv 221
22 /// =++=                   (21) 
              
AAAA
B rryayyrv 11
2
2 //)( =+=−                    (22) 
 
In a similar fashion, node B derives the values of r1C and r2C 
from vBC received from node C. Now, the node B computes 
CBA rrrr 1111 ++=  and 
CBA rrrr 2222 ++=  since it has 
access to the values of all these variables. The values of FB and 
FC are broadcast by nodes B and C in unencrypted from. 
Hence, the node B has access to both these values. Using (7) 
and (8), node B computes the values of a and c, since these are 
the two unknowns in the two linear simultaneously equations.  
In order to defend against the above vulnerability, the 
CPDA protocol needs further modification. In this modified 
version, after the values vAA, vAB, and vAC are generated and 
shared by A, B and C respectively, the nodes check whether the 
following constraints are satisfied: vAA + vAB > vAC, vAB + vAC > 
vA
A
, and vAC + vAA > vAB. The nodes proceed for further 
execution of the algorithm only if the above three inequalities 
are satisfied. If all three inequalities are not satisfied, there will 
be a possibility that the random numbers generated by one 
node is much larger than those generated by other nodes – a 
scenario which indicates a possible attack by a malicious node.   
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In-network data aggregation in WSNs is a technique that 
combines partial results at the intermediate nodes en route to 
the base station (i.e. the node issuing the query), thereby 
reducing the communication overhead and optimizing the 
bandwidth utilization in the wireless links. However, this 
techniques raises privacy issues of the sensor nodes which 
needs to share their data with the aggregator node. In 
applications such as health care and military surveillance where 
the sensitivity of the private data of the sensors is very high, the 
aggregation has to be carried out in a privacy-preserving way, 
so that the sensitive data are not revealed to the aggregator. A 
very popular scheme for this purpose exists in the literature 
which is known as CPDA. Although, CPDA is in literature for 
quite some time now, no vulnerability of the protocol has been 
identified so far. In this paper, we have first shown a security 
vulnerability in the CPDA protocol, in which we have 
demonstrated how a malicious sensor node in a WSN can 
exploit the protocol in such a way that it gets access to the 
private sensitive values of its neighboring nodes while data 
aggregation process takes place in an aggregator. We have also 
proposed a suitable modification of the CPDA protocol to 
make it robust against this vulnerability and also to make it 
computationally more efficient. Future plan of work includes 
experimental analysis to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed modified CPDA protocol and compare its 
computational and communication overhead with those of the 
existing  privacy homomorphism-based encryption for secure 
data aggregation in WSNs. 
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